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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
GERALDINE HUGGINS,

Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.

No. 8497

N. FREDERICK HICKEN,

Defendant and Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT
This was an action alleging medical malpractice.
The parties will be designated as they appeared in
the trial court.
Plaintiff has appealed from a judgment of the District Court of Salt Lake County, Martin M. Larson,
Judge. At the close of the evidence, defendant moved for
a directed verdict, which motion was retained under advisement while the jury considered the case. A verdict
in favor of plaintiff was returned in the amount of $7,-
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589.00, and the Court, without leaving the bench, set aside
the verdict and dismissed the action (R. 363).

The rule asserted by plain tiff at the beginning of
her brief, that facts should be viewed in the light most
favorable to her, does not contemplate that the Court
should be asked to ignore facts against plaintiff or to
overlook a failure of :proof. Since defendant believes
both vices are present in plaintiff's brief, defendant has
prepared a Statement of Fact.
Care should be exercised in reading the Transcript,
since it is replete with typographical errors.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant is an experienced surgeon, whose proficiency in the surgical arts has been recognized by certification to membership in the International College of
Surgeons, the American College of Surgeons, and the
Southwestern Surgical Congress.
In July, 1954, plaintiff consulted defendant about a
gall bladder condition. She was then 31 years of age,
unmarried and an insurance agent by profession. Plaintiff's gall bladder was re1noved by the defendant August
2. 1954, at L.D.S. Hospital in Salt Lake City, Utah.
Plaintiff's complaint was in two counts. The second
count alleged defendant, during the gall bladder
operation, without permission, '• ... cut :plaintiff's uterus
free from an attnehmPnt to her abdominal ·raYity, causing
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(her) menstrual cycle to increase and become abnormal
. . . " (R. 1). The trial court dismissed this count for
fai1ure of proof at the end of plaintiff's case (R. 275 ).
Plaintiff has conceded the ruling was correct, and has
not urged its reversal in this appeal.
The first count of the complaint alleged defendant
did not properly attend plaintiff, thereby causing her
right lung to collapse "subsequent" to the operation.
(R. 1) It was admitted by plaintiff on trial that the
operation was successful and that her claim of malpractice was confined to the post-operative ·period. She contended defendant failed to exercise proper skill and
render proper care while she was still in the hospital and
that he failed to care for her at all during the week
she spent at her sister's home in Granger, Utah, prior
to her departure for Wyoming on August 20, 1954.
At a pre-trial hearing conducted by the court on
January 6, 1956, three days before trial, counsel and the
court agreed, for purposes of this trial, Dr. Hicken
would be responsible for any breach of accepted medical
standards ·committed by the doctors who comprised his
surgical team in the treatment of plaintiff but that, in
considering whether :plaintiff was afforded proper care,
in accordance with such standards, he would be entitled
to the benefit of such professional services as were
rendered plaintiff hy these doctors. The surgical team
which treated plaintiff at the hospital consisted of Doctors Hicken, McAllister, Call, Clayton and Buhler.
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Exhibit 21 is a sheaf of hospital documents comprising the original hospital records on plaintiff's case.
It consists of 29 pages, which are numbered, in ink, in the
upper right hand corner of each page. Most of the
pages, although numbered on the front side only, are
written on both sides. A reference in this brief to a
page of this exhibit may refer to both sides of the page.
Pages 20-22 contain a graph, showing pulse rate in red
ink, and temperature in blue ink.
The nurses' notes, temperature and respiration
charts, and comments of ·attending physicians reveal that
plaintiff's post-operative condition on the afternoon and
evening of August :2, and through August 3, and most of
August 4, was essentially satisfactory and apparently as
to be expected following surgical removal of a gall bladder. Plaintiff was under heavy sedation for pain, was
being feed intravenously and had a Levin tube, with continuous Ruction, running into her nostril and through her
throat into her stOinach. She was also catheterized, by
insertion of a tube in the ureters, at periodic intervals.
The operative wound was being drained by another tube.
Plaintiff testified she has no coherent 111emory of anything that occnrrerl for 2·112 rlays following the operation
and this same information was given to Dr. 'Yilliam
Rmne], ehPRt specialist, when she consulted him in June,
19fif) (R. 117).

At 4 :00 p.m., August 4th, a nurse noted that plaintiff's temperature, respiration and pulse rate had risen
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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(Exhibit 21, p. 24). Her color was not good. Her breath
sounds were abnormal. Remedial measures were commenced at once by Dr. Buhler. By 10:00 o'clock that
evening, breath sounds in the lower right lung were more
decreased and Dr. McAllister, accompanied by Dr. Clayton, examined her.
It was Dr. McAllister's clinical impression that plaintiff was experiencing the condition known as "atelectasis" (R. 301, Ex. 21, p. 17). This is a medical term
meaning imperfect expansion of a lung. (Taber's '' Cyclopedic :Medical Dictionary'' Revised 6th Edition, 1954).
It may involve all, or only part of, the lung (R. 301). In
plaintiff's case, it apparently involved only the lower
portion of her right lung, since the four doctors who
examined her in the evening of August 4, and the morning of August 5, all reported that the lower lung was
"dull" and "flat" to percussion (Ex. 21, :pp. 17-18), but
breath sounds vvere present in the upper portion.
The prompt treatment, ordered by Dr. Buhler at 5:20
p.m. August 4th, and followed by Drs. McAllister, Clayton and Call, brought results and by 1:10 a.m. August
5th, Dr. Clayton found that plaintiff's pulse rate decreased 32 points in one hour (Ex. 21, p. 18).
On the morning of August 5, the anesthesiologist who
partici1pated in the operation, Dr. Edward Scott, examined plaintiff and determined that a mucous plug had
apparently reduced her breath capacity in the right lung.
He aspirated the 'bronchial tree, causing a cough which
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

fj

freed the plug, and plaintiff's right lung began its return
to normal expansion. (R. 122, 123).
Plaintiff's temperature and pulse rate began to
recede to normal Jevels. Her temperature reached an
approximate normal reading, by rectal measurement,
in the late evening of August 5. Earlier that day, at a
time about 18 hours after the trouble started, the examining physician found her so much improved that she was
told to dangle her legs over the bed and to sit in a
chair. (Ex. 21, p. 18). She was in a chair for 20 minutes
at 10:00 a.m. August 5, 1954. (Ex. 21, p. 24).
An X-ray examination of plaintiff's chest was made
August 6 by the hospital radiologists, Dr. Crowder and
Dr. Frederick. Their report (Ex. 21, p. 8) revealed "no
evidence of atelectasis'' and the chest, except for slight
hypo-aeration due to shallow respiration, was "normal."
The physicians' progress notes, reflecting their impressions of the plaintiff and their reports of her complaints and attitude, are found on both sides of pages 17
through 20, Exhibit :21. This source reveals that by the
evening of August 6, which \Vas 48 hours after plaintiff's
difficulties began, Dr. Ilea ton, intern, noted that "she
had no pai11, no subjective complaints" and no shortness of breath. (Ex. :21, p. 18). The next day, the breath
sounds in both lungs wPre equal and on August 8, Dr.
Call noted that she .. ambulates well and looks good." He
a]:-;o rPported that plaintiff had ''no complaints at presPnt." (gx. ~1. p. 19).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Plaintiff testified on trial that she was in constant
pain, of varying intensity, while she was hos'pitalized,
but the nurses' notes, doctors' progress notes and doctors' orders, as found in Exhibit 21, reveal that her
complaints gradually diminished,, that some of her pain
was apparently attributable to gas, since it was relieved
by enema (for example, see p. 26, Ex. 21); that she
asked for and received a shampoo on August 10, and
according to a nurse's note on August 11, was up and
about at will.
Plaintiff was discharged about noon August 13. Sh~
told the defendant she could not afford hospita:lization
and that she would convalesce at the home of her sister,
a registered nurse, residing in Granger, Utah. She was
instructed to report to Dr. Hicken's office in two days
for further post-operative care (R. 166).
From the afternoon of August 13 until her departure
with her parents for Wyoming on August 20, plaintiff
was at the home of her sister, either in or on a bed or
resting on a couch. She had what she described as
''terrific pain,'' in her right shoulder and chest, just
as she said she had had in the hospital. She was nauseated and could hold nothing on her stomach. She or her
family talked either to Dr. Hicken or to one of his associates by telephone on Saturday, August 14, Sunday, August 15 and Monday, August 16. On each occasion, medication was requested, prescribed and received, together·
with suggestions to relieve the condition. The family
also had advice from a doctor who was plaintiff's

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

8

brother-in-law, who "loolmd her over" at the family
home, according to plaintiff's witness, James Harmon

(R. 223).
Plaintiff's sister, Mrs. Harmon, testified she asked
Dr. Hicken, on August 16, to come to the house, but he
refused, stating it was too far (R. 242). This was categorically denied by Dr. Hicken, who stated he \Yas sure
he had not refused, that if he had, it "would have been
the first time in my professional career that I have ever
denied services to any patient." (R. 341).
On August 17, Dr. McAllister received a phone call
from a drug store in the Granger area, reporting that
Dr. Call had been asked to phone a prescription for
plaintiff for pain and had not done so. Dr. :McAllister
inquired concerning the condition which required use of
further drug, and when told plaintiff \Yas von1iting and
in pain, told the druggiE<t that plaintiff "should be seen
whether she desired it or whether she didn't'' and that
he would go to plaintiff, which he did. (R. 295).
U:pon his arrival at the Hannon hon1e, Dr. lfcAllister
examined plaintiff, on a couch in the living room. Her
bowel sounds were normal, and nothing was noted by
palpation. Pulse and heart action were normal. Lungs
wPre examined h~· stethoscope and by percussion, without abnonnality being found, and the doc.tor \Yas unable
to Pxplnin either hPr pain or her nan~ea. (R. 296).
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Dr. McAllister testified he wanted plaintiff to go
back to the hos1>ital, where she could get intravenous
feeding, because h,e was afraid she would become dehydrated from vomiting.

He recommended she return,

whether she could afford it or not, and told her he was
sure some ''arrangement could be made" concerning the
cost. (R. 298). Plaintiff finally admitted, on cross-examination, that Dr. McAllister had recommended that she go
back to the hospital, but she did not go. (R. 169, 255).
Dr. McAllister, on the occasion of his visit, finally
agreed to leave more pain medication, but told plaintiff
and her sister they must either come to the office or to
the hos:pital the next day - "otherwise, don't call me
any more for pain medicine." (R. 298) His recommendation was not followed.
Plaintiff continued to have pain and nausea the
next day, Wednesday, and on Thursday. On Friday,
August 20, her parents arrived to take her to her home
in Rawlins, Wyoming, and they drove her to the outpatient entrance to L.D.S. Hos:pital. Maude Huggins,
plaintiff's mother, of Rawlins, Wyoming, testified that
she and her husband prepared the back seat of the car
in a comfortable fashion for plaintiff to make the ride
to Wyoming, and before they started out on the trip, a
call was made to the hospital to see if the doctor "could
give her some pills or something to help her ,pain to see
if we eould get her home." (R. 231). Plaintiff's testimony was in accord. (R. 137, 138).
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Dr. Hicken came to the out-patient department to
see plaintiff. At his direction, the requested pain-killing
drug was given her. He testified he told plaintiff and her
parents that if "this thing was bothering her so much as
she said, why didn't she come in and go to the hospital
... 1" (R. 342) This evidence was not contradicted by
.plaintiff, although it constituted the third recommendation by defendant or his associates, in the period following her discharge from the hospital, that she should be
hospitalized. (R. 342, 136, 169, 255).
On direct examination, plaintiff testified that it was
on August 20, 1954 that she no longer considered herself under Dr. Hicken's care. (R. 139).
Plaintiff produced testimony from Alta Huggins,
from her mother and from herself to show she was hospitalized in Rawlins, \Vyoming, the day after she arrived
there and that she remained in the hospital 33 days.
X-rays were taken in that hos~pital beginning August 23,
and were introduced in evidence through the testimony
of Henry Arnold, X-ray technician who was brought here
to testify ( R. 268, et seq.).
The \Vyoming X-ray films, constituting exhibits 7
through 16, were never interpreted for the jury. On the
afternoon of the first day of trial, counsel for plaintiff,
"·hHe Dr. Rumel wa~ under direct exa~nination as plaintiff'~ thirrl witneRR, informed the court he desired to
n~k tlw doctor certain questions in the absence of the
jnr~~ (R. 97). The jnry wa~ thereupon excused for tlw
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day and Dr. Rumel was questioned regarding standards
of medical care, and was then asked to examine and
explain the medical significance of X-ray exhibits 7
through 16 (R. 101, et seq.). Plaintiff did not recall Dr.
Rumel for such testimony in the presence of the jury, nor
did plaintiff ask to have his testimony read or stipulated,
and the case went to the jury as if the testimony ha(l
never been given.
To establish a standard of medical treatment, to
which plaintiff claimed defendant did not conform, plaintiff relied principal~ly upon the testimony of defendant,
who was called as an adverse party (R. 38, et seq.), and
the testimony of Alta Huggins, plaintiff's cousin, who
was a nurse in training in August, 1954, and a registered
nurse at time of trial (R. 181). Alta's testimony concerning medical and nursing practice and procedure begins
at page 203 in the record.
By these witnesses, it was shown that the prevailing
practice in this community in August, 1954, required,
among other things, that a patient who had undergone
gall bladder surgery, was encouraged to cough, to take
deep breaths, and was turned, all at intervals of two
hours. The purpose of such treatment was to prevent, if
possible, the "onset of atelectasis" (R. 39). Dr. Hicken
said that there were "standing rules" at L.D.S. Hospital
for such treatment (R. 39). Alta Huggins agreed, stating,
when asked if such treatment was "common, routine
and proper," "I know it is." (R. 216). She stated that
nurses, of course, did not treat patients without orders
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from the doctor (R. 220), but that when the doctor
ordered coughing, turning, deep breathing and other expected post-operative care, the nurses were trained to
give these and other treatments at two-hour intervals,
and somethimes more often (R. 205).
She admitted that such orders were given by Dr.
Hicken in this case (R. 216). This, of course, was undisputed, since the orders are found in Exhibit 21, p. 9.
Alta Huggins spent a great deal of time by plaintiff's bedside. It was she who first noticed that plaintiff's condition had deteriorated on the afternoon of
August 4, which was 48 hours after surgery, and she at
once reported this fact to the nurse on duty (R. 188).
Dr. Buhler came and commenced the remedial measures
with the results previously described.
Concerning the standard of care of a patient in the
hospital in post-operative days, after the first orders are
given, evidence was received from Alta Huggins and Dr.
Hicken, who agreed, in substance, that if the patient
appears to be progressing satisfactorily, the doctor's
orders would not be changed (R. 126). However, should
her temperature and pulse rate rise ''above their expected limits,·' the treatment then to be followed would
depend upon the nature or extent of the increase in temperature and pulse rate (R. 49).
Plaintiff's pulse rate rose sharply 1n the 36-hour
pPriod aftPr the operation, and then decreased. Her
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temperature rose also, but not as much, comparatively,
as did her pulse (Ex. 21, p. 20). Her temperature, in that
period, rose to 101.6 degrees by rectum which would
be 100.6 degrees orally, since rectal te,mperatures are
one degree higher than oral (R. 312). Forty hours after
surgery, her temperature had returned to normal.
During this period, the original orders for the irnmediate post-operative care of the patient were supplemented by additional orders from four different doctor~
(Ex. 21, p. 9, 10). There was no evidence that these
supplemental orders were medically improper or insufficient under the .prevailing standards of ·care.
Whether the rises in te·mperature and puls·e were
higher than was to have been expected in gall bladder
surgery was never shown by any testimony. The inference to be drawn from the hospital records, however, is
that the increases apparently were not unexpect·ed, since
Exhibit 21 reveals that plaintiff's progress in this period
"·as observed and noted in the record by Doctors Hicken,
McAHister, Call, Clayton and Buhler, and by Nurs-es
Briggs, Bromfield, Cordey, Thompson, Christensen, Hansen, Paulsen and Webb, none of whom made any entry
on any record indicating alarm or dissatisfaction with
plaintiff's recovery.
With reference to plaintiff's contention that defendant was negligent in the care of plaintiff following her
trouble on August 4th and 5th, in that he did not order
additional X-ray of her chest, it will be recalled that an
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X-ray of the chest was ordered on the morning of August 6. The chest was normal. Plaintiff contends that
additional X-rays should have been obtained during the
next week, although there was no evidence that good
practice required additional X-rays or that plaintiff's
subjective or objective symptoms were of such a nature
that further use of X-ray was indicated by good medical
practice.
With regard to plaintiff's final claim of negligence,
which was to the effect that defendant "failed to give
the proper care and attention" (Brief, p. 21) which
plaintiff's condition required while she was at her sister's
home, the record concededly contains no evidence of what
care and attention would have been proper. The record
reveals that there were telephone consultations with one
or more of the doctors on each day for the 6-day period,
and that Dr. McAllister visited and examined plaintiff on
the evening of the 4th day. There was no evidence that
this was insufficient or that plaintiff suffered injury
or damage she would not have experienced otherwise.
At the close of plaintiff's evidence and again at the
close of all the evidence, defendant n1oved the court for
a directed verdict. The n1otions were considered by the
court while the jury deliberated. Following return of a
verdirt in favor of the plaintiff, the trial court reported
that he had carefully reviewed the record while the jury
was deliberating. From that examination he concluded
that he ronld '' ... finrl no PvirlPnce in the record from
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which the jury could find that the plaintiff's pain in her
chest and troubles, had any relationship to any act, or
lack of action on the part of Dr. Hicken ... ''
The court thereupon set aside the jury's verdict,
granted the motions by the defendant and dismissed the
action. Plaintiff did not file a motion for new trial, but
appealed directly to this Court.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED DEFEND_
ANT'S MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT AND SET
ASIDE THE VERDICT, BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE WAS
INSUFFICIENT TO SHOW EITHER NEGLIGENCE, THE
NATURE OF PLAINTIFF'S AILMENT, OR ANY CAUSAL
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THEM.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED DEFEND_
ANT'S MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT AND SET
ASIDE THE VERDICT, BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE WAS
INSUFFICIENT TO SHOW EITHER NEGLIGENCE, THE
NATURE OF PLAINTIFF'S AILMENT, OR ANY CAUSAL
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THEM.

Since plaintiff's claim of ne~ligence has been divided
by her in her brief into two periods, the first consisting
of the period <from the time of surgery until hos,pital
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discharge, and the second from hospital discharge until
her departure from Utah seven days later, her claim
will be discussed in the same division, and in the same·
order.
I-IOSPITALIZATION FOLLOWING SURGERY:
This period of time extends from the conclusion
of surgery at 3 :25 p.m. August 2, 1954 to plaintiff's dis~
charge at noon, August 13, 1954. Plaintiff first contends
that during the period immediately following surgery,
the standard of medical care prevailing in this community and the routine procedure at L.D.S. Hospital
required that the plaintiff be coughed, turned and encouraged to breathe deeply at two hour intervals. Plaintiff next contends, through the testimony of her cousin,
Alta Huggins, and by reference to the hospital chart,
that plaintiff did not receive this treatment.
However, it is undisputed that following surgery,
seven post-operative orders were issued for the treatment of this patient, including the order to "turn, cough
and encourage deep breathing and leg exercises." (Exhibit 21, p. 9). Alta Huggins conceded that such orders
were given and were proper. It is therefore clear that
this standard of n1edical care was followed by defendant
and his responsibilit~· to issue proper orders "·as fully
discharged.
lf plaintiff did not receive the treatment contemplated h~· the standard and by the rnle~ of the hospital,
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such failure was the res:ponsibility of hospital personnel,
and could not be attributable to the defendant, unless and
until some fact occurred which, in the exercise of proper
professional practice, should have put him on notice that
his orders were not being followed, and he thereafter
failed to remedy the situation.
Plaintiff has admitted that this is the law. The
court so instructed the jury, by its instruction No. 19.
Plaintiff did not except to this instruction and, under
familiar doctrine, the principle is the law of this case.
It is also the law generally. The rule is well stated by
the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, in Hohenthal vs. Smith (1940), 114
Fed. 2nd, 494, where it is said:
". . . where employees of the hospital are
negligent in carrying out the surgeon's instructions as to treatment after the operation, the
overwhelming weight of authority holds that the
. surgeon is not liable in the absence of a showing
that he was negligent in giving the instructions or
selecting the persons to carry them out, that he
was present and could have avoided the injury
by exercising due care, or that his special contract
relative to the negligent employee was such as to
make the doctrine of respondant superior applicable. . . . Part of the service furnished to the
patient and charged for by the hospital is the
assistance of nurses, interns and attendants in
caring for the patient after the operation pursuant to instructions given by the operating surgeon.
They perform the duty of their employer (the
hospital) to the patient when they carry out the
instructions of the doctor.... ''
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Plaintiff, however, asserts that if defendant had
conformed to accepted medical standards, he would have
observed facts which would have put him on notice that
his orders were not being followed by hospital personnel.
In support of this contention, it is claimed that plaintiff's
temperature and pulse rate increased during the night
following surgery, and on the next day, to such an extent
that defendant ought to have known, as a competent
surgeon, that his orders were not being followed, or that
his orders were insufficient.
The difficulty with this contention, however, is that
there was no evidence that the increase in temperature
and pulse was more than was to have been medically expected in the first hours following surgical treatment
of cholecystitis, which is the medical term for plaintiff's
illness .
.Jforeover, plaintiff's repeated assertion that plaintiff was not ''turned,'' because that word appears infrequently upon the nurses' notes, ,,~hich she asserts should
have :put the doctor on notice that his orders were being
ignored, is completely refuted by other portions of the
hospital record and the record of this trial. It is undisputed plaintiff "·af' receiving repeated injections for
pain, which were of the t~·pe that are given in the buttocks, whirh requireR turning on one side or the other
(R. 328). Further, it was not disputed, and, in fact, it
is known by any person ,,·ho has E'YE'r been hospitalized,
that when a patient i~ ''made eon1fortahle," or given
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"routine care," or given a "bed bath," that the patient
is moved so that soothing lotions may be rubbed on the
back, that bed linen is smoothed or changed or that bed
clothes are changed (R. :217, 328).

It is further within common knowledge, and certainly within the knowledge of the doctors on a case, that
when a patient is in pain, she will not remain absolutely
still, as plaintiff seems to imply, but will turn and
change her :position of her own volition. Dr. Hicken so
testified ( R. 43).
Plaintiff asserts in her brief, page 20, that she was
''turned'' only four times in 43 hours, but the record
shows that she was either turned, given a bed bath,
given medication for pain, made comfortable, given routine care, catheterized, or received a rectal tube, on lS
occasions in that period, or an average of more than once
each 2112 hours, not including examination by doctors
(Ex. 21, pp. 23, 24) .
It is, therefore, clear that plaintiff's claim that she
was ''turned'' only when that word appeared on the
hospital record, constitutes an unreasonable, improbable
and improper inference from the facts in this record.
The trial judge noted this defect in plaintiff's case at the
time of his decision. (R. 363).
On the morning of August 3rd, the first post-operative day, Dr. McAllister noted she was "doing well." The
next morning, her temperature was normal. Dr. Hicken
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testified he was of the opinion that his orders were being
carried out. No doctor ever testified that conformance
to medical standards would have required Dr. Hicken to
reach a different conclusion, under these circumstances.
There is, therefore, no showing that a competent
doctor, conforming to medically accepted standards of
treatment in post-operative gall bladder cases, would
have been placed on notice that his orders were being
ignored, or that such a doctor would have done more than
the defendant did.
Beyond this, however, is the fact that there is absolutely no basis to be found in this record for the assertion by plaintiff, in her brief at page 20, paragraph numbered 2, that defendant failed to observe the elevation
of pulse and temperature, or having noted them, failed
to take remedial measures. The record shows, in Exhibit
21, pages 9 and 10, that the original doctor's orders were
supplemented during this period by eight additional
orders, entered in ·writing by four separate doctors.
These new orders directed the adn1inistration of certain
fluids, drugs and chemical compounds, together with the
use of such apparatus a:;; was required to facilitate their
application. Plaintiff has not only failed to mention these
orders, but failed to show, on trial, that they were
improper or insufficient under prevailing medical standards of treatment for such conditions.
On this phase of the case, therefore, plaintiff did not
uphold her burden of proof. which required her. under
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long-established doctrine,

to produce facts

tending

'' affinnatively to show that the defendant ... did not
exercise such reasonable care, skill and diligence as
ordinarily is exercised . . . '' by skilled surgeons in Salt
Lake City in the treatment of such cases. Baxter vs.

Snow, 78 Utah 217, 2 P. 2nd 257.
Plaintiff has apparently now abandoned any claim
that defendant or the hospital were negligent in the treatment of her extraordinary complications which appeared
on the afternoon of August 4th. Her reason is clear, for
the hospital chart (Exhibit 21) reveals that during the
course of this treatment, and extending through the
morning of August 6th, there were recorded 52 visits
by nurses, and examinations or treatments by 8 separate
doctors.
The next assertion of negligence relates to the period
frmn August 6th to the date of discharge on August 13th.
Plaintiff contends that, during that week, her symptoms
of pain in the chest, rise and fall in temperature, and
continued requirements of heavy sedation for pain, all
indicated the need for further X-ray examination. Again,
however, no evidence was offered or received that such
symptoms as plaintiff displayed in this period would
have required, under prevalent medical standards, that a
competent physician undertake additional X-ray examination. Plaintiff impliedly recognizes this defect in her
case by asserting in her brief that X-ray is such an
accepted method of diagnosis that the need for its use
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need not be established by expert evidence. The cases
cited in support of this proposition contain correct principles of law in view of the facts in such cases. However,
no case comparable to the present case has been cited
in plaintiff's brief. While X-ray is of obvious assistance
in many cases, such as in detecting the nature and extent
of fractures, or the presence of foreign objects and
tumorous masses, it cannot be said to be a matter of common knowledge or judicial notice that good medical pra~
tice requires a surgeon to use X-ray because his patient
complains of pains after major surgery.
It must also be kept in mind that an X-ray was
taken by a competent specialist in radiology on August
6, 1954, and had been interpreted by him as essentially
normal. The record further shows without contradiction
that the X-ray films were examined by Drs. Hicken and
McAllister and that they concurred in the interpretation
of the radiologist, Dr. Frederick.
Plaintiff's contention seems to be that one X-ray
was not enough, and that defendant ought to be liable because he did not obtain more than one. A similar contention, in a fracture case in Idaho, was rejected by th~
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in the case of Moore vs.
Tremelling (1935) 78 Fed. 2nd 821, w·here, as here, no
evidence was .produced by plaintiff that local medical
Rtandards required more than one X-ray. "\Vithout such
evidence, the Court said, there is '' . . . no proof that
tlu=- appellant did not exereise sneh professional skill and
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In Boyce vs. Brown (Arizona, 1938), 77 Pac. 2nd 455,
plaintiff urged that it was negligence to fail to take an
X-ray of an ankle, many years after the defendant had reduced a fracture by surgical open reduction. Plaintiff
said such failure was "such obvious negligence that even
a layman knows it to be a departure from a proper standard.'' The Arizona Supreme Court did not agree,
stating:
"It is true that most laymen know that the
X-ray usually offers the best method of diagnosing physical changes of the interior organs of the
body, and particularly of the skeleton, short of an
actual opening of the body for ocular examination, but laymen cannot say that in all cases
where there is some trouble with the internal
organs that it is a departure from standard
medical practice to fail to take an X-ray.''
Since plaintiff did not produce evidence from a competent medical practitioner that additional X-ray was
required in order to conform to accepted practice, the
jury should not have been allowed to speculate and
should not have been allowed to substitute, in retrospect,
its untrained and lay judgment for the training and
experience of a qualified doctor, familiar with medical
standards of care in this community.
CO~V ALE SCENT

PERIOD AFTER
HOSPITAL DISCHARGE:
Plaintiff's final contention IS that in the six day
period follmving her discharge, while she was in con-
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valescence at the home of her sister in Granger, Utah,
Dr. Hicken failed "to apprise himself of or discover the
seriousness of" plaintiff's "lung complications." Plaintiff in effect alleges a form of abandonment of his patient by the defendant. Plaintiff's proof, however, fails
to support this charge in that there was no proof to
show what defendant should have done that he did not
do, except that plaintiff contends he should have visited
her on August 16, 1954, when her sister requested him
to come.
Plaintiff failed to establish by any medical evidence
whatsoever that the daily telephone consultations with
the defendant, or with one or more of his associates,
and Dr. McAllister's visit and examination on August
17th, were insufficient for the defendant to apprise
himself of plaintiff'~ condition.
The United State~ Court of A:ppeals for the District
of Columbia, in a leading case decided in 1948, was
confronted with the same plea by a plaintiff who alleged
that the defendant doctor had failed to inform himself
as to the condition of his patient, and had failed to call
upon her "·hen asked to do ~o. Jn~tiee Stephens, speaking for the Court, rulerl:
'' . . . it is not shown that such daily examina-.
tion was required in the exercise of proper professional care. ~or is it shown that Dr. Lawson
could not properly, in view of the nature of the
ailment, inform himself. as he did . . . through
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frequent telephoned reports of Mrs. Rodgers' condition after she returned home ... ''
The Court held that the case, which involved care of a
postnatal breast condition, involved
'' ... a question of the merits of a diagnosis anJ
scientific treatment. This cannot be determined
by a lay jury without the aid of expert opin-

.

lOll • • •

"

Finally the Court rejected the argument, which is also
made in the case at bar by plaintiff, that the presence
of pain required the doctor to act. Proof of pain for
an extended period, without more, does not evidence
neglect, according to the Court, and there was no evidence that due professional care required the administration of sedatives. Rodgers vs. Lawson (1948) D. C., 170
Fed. 2nd 157.
Further, plaintiff has completely failed to show, as
we believe is required in a case of alleged abandonment,
that the results which the plaintiff encountered were
otherwise than would have been the case if the alleged
abandonment had not occurred. This :principle was recently affirmed by this Court in stating the proof which
should have been made by a plaintiff in a case of alleged
abandonment. Spendlove vs. Georges, 4 Utah 2nd 393,
295 P. 2nd 336.
Beyond this, however, is another glaring weakness
in plaintiff's case---a weakness recognized by the trial
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,court when· he dismissed the action ( R. a61). Even if
there had been competent evidence of the medical standards which defendant is alleged to have breached, there
was no evidence upon which a jury could properly find a
causal relationship between the breach and plaintiff's
ultimate physical condition.

A jury should not be allowed to speculate that an
unidentified physical ailm·ent proximately resulted from
the doctor not having done more than he did in his treatment. This principle has been recognized by this Court
re:peatedly.
In Anderson vs. Nixon (l943), 104 Utah 262, 139 P.
(2d) 216, the patient had dev-eloped osteomyelitis and he
alleged that the defendant doctor negligently failed to
recognize that condition and negligently failed to treat
him for it properly, in that he should have ordered blood
transfusions. Under the evidence this Court held that
there was sufficient evidence for a jury to consider on
the question of ''Thether or not the defendant was negligent in failing to apprise hin1self of the plaintiff's condition by the use of available blood tests.
However, on the question of the causal relationship
between this failure and the end result, the Court stated:
''There was no expert evidence in this case
that if defendant had done these things at that
time the condition which caused the eventual amputation of plaintiff's leg could have been
avoided. Osteomyt>liti~ being a disease the cause
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and cure of which is peculiarly within the knowl~
edge of medical men and not a matter of common
knowledge, it is necessary to have expert testimony on the effect of the negligence of a doctor
on the end result .... In the absence of such expert
testimony there is nothing upon which a jury can
base its finding on the proximate cause of the
injury. A jury may not conjecture or speculate,
but must have substantial evidence upon which to
base a verdict."
To the same effect are both earlier and later Utah
cases. Edwards vs. Cla.rk (1938), 96 Utah 121, 83 P. (2d)
1021; Jackspn vs. Colston (1949), 116 Utah 295, 209 P.
(2d) 566.
The principle announced in these cases should be
even more forcefully applied where, as in the present
case, plaintiff has not only failed to show causation, but
has failed to establish or define, except by vague generalities, the injury which allegedly resulted.
Plaintiff describes her ultimate condition as "lung
complications.'' That this term may encompass any one
or more of a vast number of ailments of the human
breathing apparatus is so obvious as to require no citation of authority, either medical or legal. That such ailments may result from a multitude of causes, eithe:·
singly or in combination, is equally clear.
The only evidence offered to aid the jury 1n determining what had occurred after plaintiff left Utah
consisted of testimony from plaintiff and her family of
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her pain, her nausea, and her hospitalization in Wyoming, together with X-ray films which were introduced
in evidence by the testimony of the technician who operated the X-ray machine in the Wyoming hospital and who
was brought here to testify. Although plaintiff said she
was treated by two physicians in Wyoming, neither was
brought here to testify nor was there any attempt to
obtain the testimony of these, or any other doctors, either
by oral deposition or written interrogatories.
The X-ray films from Wyoming, although in court
during most of the trial, were never interpreted for the
jury, even though at one time or another five physicians
were present in court, subject to call. Thus the jury was
allowed to interpret X-rays and to base a verdict, in part,
upon its untrained observation of X-ray films, when it is
a matter of common knowledge that even medical men
often have difficulty in interpreting such films despite
their training and experience.
An example of this difficulty is found in that portion
of Dr. Rumel's testimony which was presented to the
jury. He was shown two X-ray films of plaintiff's spinal
area. But, despite his obvious ability to interpret X-rays,
he declined to eomment upon the films handed him,
stat_ing:
''I'm supposed to know about chests. These
are spine tones .... ''I 'n1 not supposed to know
about that. ... I don't pretend to know that.'·
(R. 90, 91).
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The only "aid "afforded the jury in understanding
the X-rays was upon final argument of plaintiff's counsel, who placed some of the films in the view box and·
attempted to interpret them to the jury. He claimed that
they showed damage and deterioration of the lung,. and
that the condition obviously resulted from defendant's
lack of care.
Counsel, of course, did not go so far as to claim that
his argument constituted evidence or that he was a
medical expert on lung conditions or their caThSes. However, since there was no proof, his statement of cause
and effect may have impressed the jury of laymen as
being at least logically correct.
Members of the jury, it will be recalled, were not
permitted to hear Dr. Rumel's testimony that the lung
condition :portrayed in the Wyoming X-rays can result
in ''an hour or two,'' from a number of different causes,
of which an embolus, or blood clot, would be ''statistically
the most common" (R. 11~, 113).
From what has been said regarding proof of ·events
following plaintiff's discharge from L.D.S. Hospital, it
is clear she did not prove a medical standard or a departure therefrom, did not prove the nature of the injury
she allegedly suffered and did not prove that any other
result would have been reached had the defendant done
more, or other, than he did.
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CONCLUSION
Defendant believes it clear that no judge, and particularly a judge with long experience on the bench and
at the bar, lightly sets aside a substantial verdict which
has been awarded to plaintiff only moments earlier.
When such a verdict is r·eversed, it is because the trial
court finds that his duty compelled the act.
We earnestly contend that upon the written record
only in this case, a record which reveals neither negligence nor proximate cause, the trial court was required
to dismiss this action as a matter of law.
His judgment, based not only upon the written record, but upon his personal observation of the witnesses
and all other factors in the trial, factors which are never
discernible on the printed page, was sound, both in principle and in precedent and such judgment ought to be affirmed by this court.

---------0-------Should the Supre1ne Court reject the foregoing argument and find it neces.sary to reverse the order of the
trial court, defendant urges that the verdict ought not to
be reinstated and judgment entered thereon, because defendant believes he is entitled in such eYent, as a matter
of law, to a new trial, and in support of such contention,
defendant relies upon the following additional Staten1ent
of Points, which he asks that the Supreme Court consider
if, and only if, the Court finds it necessary to reverse the
ord<'r of tlw trial court.
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ADDITIONAL STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR, SUBSTANTIALLY PREJUDICIAL TO THE DEFENDANT, IN
ITS INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY NUMBERED 6, 7, 10,
11, 14, 17 AND 18.
POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR, SUBSTANTIALLY PREJUDICIAL TO THE DEFENDANT, IN
REFUSING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY IN ACCORDANCE
WITH DEFENDANT'S REQUESTS NUMBERED 1, 3, 8, 15,
17 and 19.
POINT III.
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR SUBSTANTIALLY PREJUDICIAL TO THE DEFENDANT, IN
RECEIVING EVIDENCE R E G A R D I N G PLAINTIFF'S
PHYSICAL CONDITION, AND MEDICAL TREATMENT
AFFORDED HER IN THE STATE OF WYOMING FOLLOWING AUGUST 20, 1954, AND RELATING TO HER PHYSICAL
CONDITION SINCE HER RETURN FROM WYOMING, BECAUSE NONE OF SUCH EVIDENCE WAS PRECEDED BY
A PROPER FOUNDATION SHOWING A CAUSAL RELATION WITH ANY ACT OR OMISSION CHARGED
AGAINST DEFENDANT.

ADDITIONAL ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR, SUBSTANTIALLY PREJUDICIAL TO THE DEFENDANT, IN
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ITS INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY NUMBERED 6, 7, 10,
11, 14, 17 AND 18.

The instructions given the jury by the trial court
were inadvertently omitted by the clerk of the lower
court at the time the record was transmitted to the
Supreme Court, and were forwarded under separate
certificate dated August 7, 1956. The instructions are
therefore not serially numbered with the remainder of
the record, and must be examined by number.
Instruction 6 is a ''stock'' instruction relating to
the terms "negligence," "ordinary care" and "proximate cause." It is believed to be objectionable in a
case of alleged medical malpractice, which is essentially
a specialized branch of the law of negligence. It allowed
the jury to consider the standard of the ''reasonably prudent person,'' and stated:
''The duty is dictated and measured by the
exigencies of the occasion. ''
Instruction 7 carried this san1e thought forward, and
applied it to this case stating that the jury could find
the defendant liable if it determined:
'' ... that he was careless or negligent in caring
for the plain tiff. . . . "
This is not the test in medical negligence cases. The
true n1easure is whether there was exercised "that
degree of care and skill considered proper by correct
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and accepted standards of the profession.... " Forrest
vs. Eason (Utah, 1953), 261 P. (2d) 178.
The trial court, of course, recognized this rule, and
informed the jury, in its Instruction 17, that it was required to consider what the medical standard was when
it determined ''whether the defendant and the other
doctors associated with him properly fulfilled the dutie8
imposed upon them.... " This, however, was near the
end of the instructions, and long after the jury had been
told they could find defendant liable if he disregarded
ordinary prudence. Further, this instruction contained
the first reference to ''other doctors associated with''
defendant, and the jury may well have considered this
not to be a modification of the earlier instructions which
related to the defendant alone.
Instruction 17 further did not cure the error in the
earlier instructions, because it did not properly tell the
jury how the medical standard of care should have been
proven. It allowed the jury to determine the standard
"through evidence presented in this trial as to such
standards and practices.'' Nowhere was the jury told
that the evidence must have been presented by medical
experts and since plaintiff relied heavily upon the testimony of her cousin, Alta Huggins, a student nurse at
L.D.S. Hospital, to discuss hospital and medical practice,
it seems clear that the jury was allowed to consider other
than medical evidence in determining the medical
standard.
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This constituted prejudicial error. This was a case
involving the detennination of the care which ought to
be given, post-operatively, to a person with the disease of
cholecystitis. As such, the general rule announced by this
Court in Fredrickson vs. Maw (1951), 227 P. (2d) 772,
should govern. The Court said:
'' ... in those cases which depend upon knowledge
of the scientific effect of medicine, the results of
surgery ... whether the attending physician exercised the ordinary care, skill and knowledge required of doctors in the community which he
serves, must ordinarily be established by the testimony of physicians. There is, however, another
well-recognized rule holding that when facts may
be ascertained by the ordinary use of the senses
of lay witnesses, it is not necessary that expert
testimony be produced and relied upon.''
This is obviously not a case where "facts may be
ascertained by ordinary use of the senses of lay witnesses.'' As the Court stated, .such ca~es are usually the
so-called ''sponge'' cases, where an object, foreign to the
body, is left ·within it. 'Ve have found no ease, and plaintiff has cited none, where the "sponge case rule" has
been extended to embrace facts such as were before the
Conrt in this case.
It is no answer to the foregoing to say that the trial
court corrected its errors regarding the medical standard
hy its Instruction 18, which further explained the test to
he applied by the jnr~·. The test, said the court, was
whf'th0r the plaintiff "wa~ treated \Yith the sa1ne
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methods, skill and care ordinarily used in like cases by
surgeons in hospitals in the neighborhood, and given
the attention and treatment usually and ordinarily given
to such patient by nurses and attendants." (Italics
supplied).
This instruction not only did not mention the requirement that the evidence of the standard must come
from medical testimony, but allowed the jury to believe
that the defendant was responsible for the care given
by nurses and attendants, which, as has been pointed out
earlier in this brief, is not the law generally, nor the law
of this case, and was directly contradictory with the
court's instruction 19.
Under Instruction 18, since there were two tests
given the jury to consider, and since they were stated
conjunctively, the jury could find that unless the plaintiff was treated with the same methods, skill and care
ordinarily used in like cases by surgeons in this vicinity
and also received care from nurses and attendants
ordinarily given such patients, the defendant would be
liable. Thus, if the jury found that either test was not
met, it was told defendant would be liable, yet the responsibility of hospital care was clearly not his if he
gave proper orders, which he did, and if nothing occurred
to :put him on notice they were not being followed.
Defendant contends Instructions 10 and 11 were improper in a_ number of particulars. Instruction 10 purports to inform the jury of the plaintiff's claim of negli-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

36
gence, and submits, for jury consideration, elements of
the claim which were not supported by any substantial
evidence. Instruction 11 informed the jury what its verdict should be if the elements in No. 10 were proved.
Since Instruction 10 is divided into paragraphs
designated (a) through (e) the objectionable portions
will be discussed under similar headings.
lO(a): This paragraph advised the jury ·Of the claim
that "defendant failed and neglected to visit plaintiff
and examine her condition as frequently as was the
standard ... " of surgeons in Salt Lake City in similar
cases. From what has been said in the earlier portions of
this brief, it is clear that there was no evidence of any
kind as to such standard. Defendant, when called as an
advers·e witness for the purpose of establishing a medical
standard, was never even asked about the ''frequency of
visits or examinations,'' nor was any other doctor.

In addition, this portion of the instruction was
limited to the defendant alone, although it was clear that
defendant's associate doctors should have been mentioned, as they were later, in Instruction 17.
lO(b): Here, the jury

"~as

told of the claim that
defendant had failed to issue proper orders and direCtions to the nurses. This should not have been submitted
to the jury, in view of the undisputed evidence that such
orders were, in fact, p;iYen in1mediately follo·wing surgery
anrl in view of the further fact that there was never any
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evidence that the additional orders, in the days that followed, were improper or insufficient under the prevailing standard of care, or that the orders which were given
were improper.
lO(c): This stated that plaintiff claimed that de-

fendant "did not see that the nurses and attendants
obeyed and fulfilled his orders." H,e was not required
to take such action, unless and until some fact occurred
which put him on notice that his orders were not being
obeyed or fulfilled. The jury should have been so told,
in this instruction, because, in Instruction 11, the court
stated that if plaintiff had proved the matters set forth
in the sub-:paragraphs of Instruction 10, they should find
for plaintiff. Hence, it is natural they would look only
to No. 10 and not feel required to search through the entire set of twenty- five instructions to see if the formula
given them in Instructions 10 and 11 was modified.
lO(d) and (e): By these paragraphs, the jury was

advised that plaintiff claimed she developed and suffered
a collapsed lung as a result of neglect .of the defendant,
and that she endured physical and mental pain and suffering and was impaired in body, as a result of the collapsed lung. As has been pointed out repeatedly in this
brief, there was no substantial evidence to this effect,
and it is fundamental that a question should not be submitted for jury consideration unless it is supported by
'tluch evidence.
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Finally, defendant asserts that while the instructions, as a whole, contain many correct statements of the
principles of law involved, the jury could not have
applied them as the court intended them to be appliea,
in view of the flat statement by the Court, in Instruction
11, that if the elements set forth in the sub-paragraphs
of Instruction 10 were proved, the jury's verdict ''should
be in favor of plaintiff ... , and you must assess plaintiff's damage.''
It is unlikely that any jury, regardless of the merits
of the instructions as a whole, would overlook the opportunity presented by such a peremptory formula for decision.
POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR, SUBSTANTIALLY PREJUDICIAL TO THE DEFENDANT, IN
REFUSING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY IN ACCORDANCE
WITH DEFENDANT'S REQUESTS NUMBERED 1, 3, 8, 15,
17 and 19.

Defendant has already stated, in the main argument
in this brief, his reasons why he believes the court should
have instructed the jury in accordance with defendant's
Request No. 1, whirh was a request for directed verdict.
Defendant's request No. 3 "·as given in part by the
Court in its Instruction 19, but the court omitted the
nJ.ost important part of the request, which was to the
pff<>rt that evidence of medical standards ought to haYe
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been receiv·ed from a doctor or doctors called as expert
medical witnesses. This has already been discussed by
defendant in the argument under the preceding point
wherein the general rule set forth in the case of Fredrick-

son vs. Maw

~waR

discussed.

Defendants Request No. 8, although marked by the
trial court as ''covered" was not given, even in part.
This Request, in substance, would have: instructed the
jury that the plaintiff, to sustain her burden of proof,
was required to show by a preponderance of the evidence
that the injury allegedly suffered by her would not have
occurred without neglect by the defendant, and that plaintiff "~ould not satisfy that burden of proof unless she
showed that the result would probably have been different had the defendant acted with due care.
Failure to give this Request deprived defendant of
one of the theories of his defense. The theory was based
upon the rule to be draiYn from the prevjously discussed
case of Anderson vs. Nixon, 139 P. (2d) at page 220. It
will be recalled that that case involved osteomyelitis and
the effect of blood transfusions on the progress of that
disease. There was no evidence that if the defendant doctor had given blood transfusions the end result would
have been avoided. This constituted a fatal defect in the
ca:;:p, according to the opinion of this Court.
Defendant's Request ~ o. 15 set forth the defendant's
theory that he could not be held responsible for any inSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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jury of plaintiff which resulted from the failure of due
care of hospital personnel, unless and until some fact
occurred .by which he knew, or should have known, that
the orders he had given were not being followed and that
he thereafter failed to take -corrective measures and that
as a result of such failure plaintiff was injured.
The trial court marked upon this Request the words
In ink "·substance covered."
Later while the jury was in deliberation there was
written by the court, in pencil, the words "should probably have been given". We submit the r·eason for 1the
latter comment was that the court's instruction No. 19,
which attempted to cover the matters contained in this
Request, failed to apply the principal of proximate causation to this theory of defense, and thus failed to present
completely one of the theories upon which defendant had
relied.
Although defendant's answer was amended by leave
of ·court, asked and obtained at pre-trial, to include the
defense of contributory negligence, the court refused
to give defendant's Request No. 17, which set forth
another theory of defense. Although there had been
considerable empha~i~ placed by defendant upon the
plaintiff's failure to follow the recon1mendations of Dr.
McAllister and Dr. Hicken on August 17. 19 and 20,
1954, which rerommendations '"ere to the effect that
plaintiff ought to return to tlH' hospital, the court reSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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fused this request with the comment "outside issues".
This was an apparent inadvertence on the part of the
trial court since defendant's answer contains, upon the
margin of the first page, this notation by the trial judge:
"Deft. permitted to amend to include ·contributory".
It will be noted that the Request concerning contributory negligence sought merely to mitigate damage::;
to the extent that if the jury found that plaintiff had
failed to follow her doctor's recommendation, she would
not be entitled to any sum for damages suffered frmn
that time forward.
Defendant's Request No. 19 was tendered for the
purpose of informing the jury that it should not consider
Dr. I-Iicken 's conduct alone on this case, but should
consider the conduct of his associate doctors, and if such
doctors failed in their duty toward plaintiff, such failure
would be chargeable to the defendant, but if they assisted
in the performance of such duty, such assistance would
be to the benefit of the defendant and could be considered
by the jury as if defendant himself had performed such
acts.
This theory was in accord with the understanding
reached by the court and counsel upon the pre-trial
hearing and was the theory upon which the case was
tried to the jury, even though plaintiff continually emphasized the alleged failure of Dr. I-Iicken personally
to visit or treat plaintiff.
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The theory was mentioned by the court in its Instruction 17, wherein the jury was instructed concerning
the method of determining a proper standard of medical
care. The court began that Instruction by stating "In
determining whether the defendant and the other doctors
associated with him properly fufilled the duties imposed
upon them.''
Plaintiff did not except to this Instruction and it
was noted that throughout the trial plaintiff was perfectly willing to follow this theory of ''doctors in association" whenever it best suited her purpose.
Failure to give this instruction constituted prejudicial error, which was spe-cifically recognized by the
trial court jn his decision at the end of the case (R. 362).
POINT III.
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR SUBSTANTIALLY PREJUDICIAL TO THE DEFENDANT, IN
RECEIVING EVIDENCE REGARDING PLAINTIFF'S
PHYSICAL CONDITION, AND MEDICAL TREATMENT
AFFORDED HER IN THE STATE OF WYOMING FOLLOWING AUGUST 20, 1954, AND RELATING TO HER PHYSICAL
CONDITION SINCE HER RETURN FROM WYOMING, BECAUSE NONE OF SUCH EVIDENCE WAS PRECEDED BY
A PROPER FOUNDATION SHOWING A CAUSAL RELATION WITH ANY ACT OR OMISSION CHARGED
AGAINST DEFENDANT.

wn~

rrhe evidence to which defendant objects and which
l'('('f'lVPd erroneon~ly consisted of exhibits relating
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to charges for medical care and hospitalization claimed
by plaintiff to have been incurred in Rawlins, Wyoming,
following her departure from Salt Lake City. There was
no proper foundation for this evidence.
There was no showing of the nature of

plaintiff'~

ailment which required treatment or hospitalization and
no evidence that the expenses were attributable to any
act or omission upon the part of the defendant.
The evidence was also improperly received because
it was not submitted by any testimony that the charges
made by the Wyoming doctors and hospital were reasonable or reasonably necessary.
Further, the court erroneously received evidence concerning alleged loss of earnings and earning power on
the part of the plaintiff during a seventeen month
period following her departure from Salt Lake City.
The jury was instructed concerning these claims in th8
court's Instructions 22 and 23, but there was no evidence
of any kind from which a jury would properly have found
that plaintiff had had an impairment of earning power
or loss of earnings ·caused by or resulting from any
act or omission on the part of the defendant.
Defendant believes that the reception of such evidence by the court was prejudicial. The trial court
agreed, stating: " ... reception of that evidence in the
record was error-very prejudicial in its nature-because
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it left the way open to inferences, presumption of fact
and conclusions without any proper basis therefor, and
there is no evidence that the expenses incurred were
incurred in ·connection with, or as a result of anything
involved in the action which was on trial here in court."
(R. 361, 362).

SUMMARY OF ADDITIONAL ARGUMENT
We believe, as did the trial judge, that plaintiff
failed to establish actionable negligence. Should the
Supreme Court disagree, we submit that the Court should
not reinstate the jury verdict and direct entry of judgment, for the effect of the errors described in the foregoing Additional Argument was to deprive the defendant of his fundamental right to a fair and impartial
trial, and, under such circumstances, defendant is entitled, as a matter of law, to a new trial, where such
errors, clearly recognized by the trial court, would not
be likely to recur.
Respectfully submitted,

SKEEN, "TORSLEY. SXO\Y &
CHRISTENSEN and JOHN H. SNOW
Attorneys for Defendant and
Respondent.
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